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Abstract
This article analyses the relationship between EU security, integration and associated members, 
using insights from security studies and the literature on Europeanization. While much recent 
literature emphasizes either the EU’s insignificance as a security actor or its importance as a 
normative and global actor, I investigate its role as a security actor in its own region, arguing that 
the EU is primarily a regional security actor. I make two general claims: (1) it is the development 
of common rules and values in various policy areas that constitutes the basis for the EU as a 
security actor; (2) it is the successful projection of these rules and values beyond EU borders that 
will determine the impact of the EU as a security actor. The aim is therefore to show how the EU 
promotes security and stability through the externalization of rules and values through various 
processes, association agreements and neighbourhood policies.  
Pernille Rieker
Integration, Security and  
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The EU as a Regional Security Provider

Introduction 
With this article I emphasize the value of the European Union as an 
important regional security actor. While this is nothing new, most of 
the recent literature on the EU as a security actor seems to either neg-
lect or take for granted this crucial aspect, instead evaluating its per-
formance as a global or international security actor. There is a sizeable 
literature that discusses whether the EU is a security actor as well as 
what kind of security actor the EU may be. While some have cha-
racterized the EU as a new global superpower (McCormick 2007; 
Moracscik 2010) or normative power (Manners 2002, 2006; Sjursen 
2006), others see it as an insignificant security actor (Hill 2007; 
Hoffmann 2000; Hyde-Price 2006, 2008; Kagan 2003) or a small po-
wer (Toje 2011). I argue that we should re-examine the relationship 
between regional integration and security in order to be able to com-
prehend the role of the EU as a security actor. 
 
This is based on the idea that the integration process must be under-
stood as primarily a peace project. While this view builds on familiar 
theories of democratic peace, complex interdependence and security 
communities, my discussion of the more specific mechanisms of how 
this peace project evolves and spreads beyond the borders of the 
community (or the union) builds on insights from the literature on Eu-
ropean governance and Europeanization. This article aims to combine 
the two fields more explicitly than previously, in order to show how 
and to what extent the EU has become a successful security actor on 
the European continent and in its near abroad. I make two general 
claims: First, that it is the development of common rules and values 
that constitutes the basis of the EU as a security actor. Second, that it 
is the successful projection of these rules and values beyond EU bor-
ders through various processes, such as the enlargement process, to-
gether with various association agreements and neighbourhood poli-
cies, that will determine its impact as a security actor.  
 
To what extent does the EU manage to promote security and stability 
through the externalization of rules and values in its neighbourhood? 
While there is general agreement that both the enlargement process 
and the ENP can be seen as security policy processes, and natural ex-
tensions of the integration process, also EU policy towards the EFTA 
countries is built on a similar logic, namely the interest ‘of creating an 
environment as similar as possible to the Union, in legal terms, 
through export of its norms’ (Hillion 2011). In fact, the successful ex-
port of the EU acquis to third countries – whether defined as candida-
6 Pernille Rieker 
tes, ENP states or neither of the two, like the EFTA states – implies 
that the distinction between insiders and outsiders is becoming in-
creasingly blurred. This tendency is further accentuated by differentia-
ted membership, whereby EU member states are unequally integrated 
with various EU policies. 
 
In this article I discuss the relationship between the integration process 
and regional security, examining how this security dynamic is trans-
ferred to various categories of non-members or associated countries. 
In order to get a comprehensive understanding of how the EU func-
tions as a regional security actor, I look into its policies towards four 
categories of associated non-members EEA countries, candidate coun-
tries, ENP partner countries in the East, and ENP partner countries in 
the South. I argue that the EU’s impact as a regional security actor 
will depend on the level of integration between the neighbouring 
countries and the Union. In turn, the level of integration will depend 
on: (1) the scope of the association agreements;  (2) the level of partic-
ipation in EU policies;  and (3) the level of Europeanization or adapta-
tion to EU rules, norms and values. High scores on all dimensions will 
indicate a high level of integration. I then discuss these theoretical 
foundations of these three dimensions, and conclude by investigating 
how one or two countries from each of the four groups mentioned 
above score on these three dimensions.  
 
   
 
Security and the externalization of 
norms, rules and values 
There are reasons to believe that greater integration makes the EU 
more effective as a regional security actor. However, in order to un-
derstand better how the EU actually functions as a security actor in the 
region, we need to know how rules, norms and values in various poli-
cy areas are externalized to several categories of third countries. Here 
I present three factors or micro-mechanisms that are important for the-
se countries’ level of integration with the EU, and inquire into the 
security implications of differences with regard to: (1) the scope of the 
various association agreements; (2) the degree of involvement or par-
ticipation; and (3) the degree of adaptation to EU standards. 
The scope of association agreements 
The need to study the scope of association agreements builds on the 
assumption that the broader the scope of the association is – in terms 
of comprehensiveness (the policy areas it covers) and dynamism – the 
more integrated will the associated country be. In turn, this can be ex-
pected to have positive effects on security and stability in the region. 
This is similar to the basic neoliberal argument of the relationship 
between interdependence and security, or that a high degree of inter-
dependence leads to greater interstate cooperation and is therefore a 
force for stability (Keohane and Nye 1977).  
 
To some extent, the interdependence argument is also at the basis of 
the integration process. After all, it was precisely the wish for lasting 
peace and stability among the countries of Europe after two disastrous 
world wars that made the integration process so important. Also other 
factors have contributed to peace and stability in this part of the world, 
but there can be little doubt that stronger economic integration has 
been an important instrument for creating peace in Europe. Still, the 
European integration process moves somewhat beyond the inter-
dependence logic (Sæter 1998). According to Buzan et al., the ‘Euro-
pean Security Complex’ is characterized by centralization with the EU 
as the core. They do not consider a reversal of this process likely, 
since any form of fragmentation of the European integration process 
would have negative security policy consequences (Buzan 1991; 
Buzan and Wæver 2004; Buzan et al. 1998).  
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This means that even in times of serious crisis in the EU (such as the 
current economic, social, and financial crisis), fragmentation of the 
Union is not very likely. On the contrary, there is still a will and pos-
sibly a functional need to externalize this logic by making it valid also 
beyond EU borders. The enlargement process, and more recently the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) should be recognized as a 
continuation of this idea (Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008; Kelly 2006; 
Lavanex 2004; Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009 ; Rieker 2012; 
Sæter 2003). This understanding of European security is based on a 
wide security concept where it is the very process of development of 
common rules and values within various policy areas, as well as the 
successful projection of these rules and values beyond EU borders, 
that constitutes the basis of the EU as a security actor.  
 
In this sense, the EU has developed towards what Adler and Barnett 
have referred to as a ‘tightly coupled security community’ (Adler and 
Barnett 1998; Rieker 2006). Whereas a loosely coupled security 
community has a low degree of political integration, a tightly coupled 
one is characterized by a high degree of political integration. Here we 
should note that this is not to be understood as a dichotomous relat-
ionship, but rather a continuum with varying degrees of loose or tight 
coupling. The EU, being the result of an integration process and thus 
something in-between an international organization and a federal sta-
te, has gradually evolved and moved along this continuum, towards 
becoming a more tightly coupled security community 
 
While relations between the EU and the associated members can also 
be characterized by interdependence, the asymmetry between the two 
makes it fruitful to supplement this approach with insights from what 
is often referred to as the theory of hegemonial stability (Ikenberry 
and Kupchan 1990; Krasner 1976; Pedersen 2002). Whereas complex 
interdependence may create peace and stability, regional stability is 
often dependent upon a hegemon that can establish norms and rules 
and then superintend their functioning by enlightened use of its 
capability to encourage other members to comply with these norms 
and rules. In the literature on European integration, these processes are 
often referred to as ‘Europeanization’ (Featherstone 2002; Olsen 
2002; Radaelli 2000). While this literature is primarily interested in 
uncovering the mechanisms through which such processes of norms 
are transferred or compliance takes place, there has also been an in-
creased interest in studying the externalization of these norms beyond 
the EU as such (Lavanex 2004; Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009). 
This article investigates the scope of the different kinds of associa-
tionagreements based on the assumption that more areas these 
agreements cover and the more binding or committing they are, the 
more important is the EU as a regional security actor. 
Integration, Security and Associated Non-members. The EU as a Regional Security Provider   9 
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Degree of participation  
Closely linked to this is the degree of involvement or participation in 
the various EU policies. The level of integration and thus also inter-
dependence and stability depends not only on the scope of the 
agreement, but also on the level of involvement or participation of the 
associated country in various EU policies. The higher the degree of 
participation in EU policies and the more committed a country is, the 
more likely will it be to develop a security community built on a 
common understanding or identity. Writing in the 1950s, Karl 
Deutsch developed the concept of a ‘security community’, which he 
saw as a form of international cooperation that, under certain cir-
cumstances, could lead to integration (Deutsch 1957). Deutsch argued 
that a security community was formed by participating actors when 
their people, and their political elites in particular, shared stable ex-
pectations of peace in the present and for the future. Deutsch’s 
perspective represented an important break with previous perspectives 
on macro-politics. His approach was more oriented towards the actual 
practices of the participating states and how these practices contribute 
to develop a common identity and a ‘we-feeling’.  
 
According to Pouliot, however, it is diplomacy that could be charac-
terized as a practice that may lead to the establishment of a security 
community (Pouliot 2008, 2010). He actually develops a theory of 
practice of security communities in which he argues that peace exists 
in and through practice when the practical sense of security officials 
makes diplomacy the self-evident way to solve interstate disputes. 
Frédéric Mérand has applied such a perspective on a study of the de-
velopment of the European Security and Defence Policy (Mérand 
2010). He concludes that the diplomatic practices in that instance fol-
lowed neither a rational nor a structural pattern, but rather a hapha-
zard, creative and combinational one – which indicates that diplomats 
and security officials may often end up with something completely 
unlike what they had planned. 
 
This participation or involvement may take various forms. On the one 
hand, the associated country may participate actively in specific EU 
policies, contributing various forms of (human, economic or technical) 
resources. On the other hand, the participation may be more passive, 
like being invited to attend meetings as observers. However, the more 
active the participation in  EU policies, the more important is the EU 
as a stabilizing force. 
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Degree of adaptation/Europeanization 
In addition to the scope of the agreements and the level of participa-
tion, the degree of adaptation in terms of adjustment made to EU ru-
les, norms and values at the national level is also important in evalua-
ting the EU as a regional security actor. As well as determining the 
degree of adaptations to EU rules (or Europeanization), such an ana-
lysis may also be able to uncover whether these adaptations are effec-
tive – whether they are real, or mere window dressing.  
 
In a special issue of Journal of European Public Policy from 2009 this 
topic is examined precisely in relation to the EU’s various categories 
of neighbours. In their introductory article, Lavanex and Schimmel-
fennig discuss the concept of ‘external governance’, which seeks to 
capture the expanding scope of EU rules beyond EU borders. The arti-
cle looks into the theoretical foundations of the concept and identify 
various institutional modes through which this external governance is 
the most effective (Lavanex and Schimmelfenning 2009). They dis-
tinguish between three sets of factors –institutions, power and domes-
tic structures – and argue that differences in these factors may explain 
why the degree of adaptation to EU standards varies among the cate-
gories of ‘neighbourhood’ countries. According to an institutionalist 
explanation, the modes and effects of external governance are ‘auto-
matically’ shaped by internal EU modes of governance and rules. By 
contrast, the power-based explanation focuses on the extent to which 
the EU has the power to enforce compliance in one way or the other. 
This power will exist only if there is perceived interdependence 
between the EU and the country in question. While such a power 
structure has existed in the relationship between the EU and candidate 
countries, it is not necessarily present in relation to the neighbourhood 
countries. Finally there might be differences in the domestic structures 
of the neighbouring countries that facilitate compliance to varying de-
grees.  
 
In addition to these factors that may facilitate or constrain Europeani-
zation beyond EU borders, this Europeanization process may assume a 
range of forms. Lavanex and Schimmelfennig distinguish between 
three basic institutional forms: hierarchy, networks and market. Hie-
rarchical governance takes place in a formalized relationship of domi-
nation and subordination exerted through legislation, as with the EEA 
agreement between the EU and some EFTA countries (currently Nor-
way, Iceland and Lichtenstein). In contrast to hierarchy, a network 
constellation delineates a relationship in which the actors are formally 
equal. This does not preclude the possibility of power asymmetries, 
but it means that, in institutional terms, the actors have equal rights. 
Some elements of the ENP Action Plans may be taken as examples of 
such network constellations. Finally, the market model is linked to the 
Integration, Security and Associated Non-members. The EU as a Regional Security Provider   11 
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principle of mutual recognition rather than common rules. The bilate-
ral agreement with Switzerland may be seen as an example of this 
form of Europeanization. Lavanex and Schimmelfennig also argue 
that the degree of Europeanization varies among policy sectors to a 
greater extent than the case in relation to the enlargement process.  
 
How then can we investigate the effectiveness of Europeanization or 
‘external governance’ in relation to the neighbourhood countries? This 
is a pertinent question, as it can link in with our assessment of the ef-
fectiveness of the EU as a regional security actor. I am less concerned 
with how compliance takes place, which is the focus of most of the 
existing literature. Instead, I focus on whether such Europeanization 
takes place at all, and whether it has a positive effect on stability and 
security. One important indication that the adaptation is real (and not 
simply window dressing) is if there are shared interests, cooperation 
and eventually trust, mutual understanding and few conflicts, and not 
a relationship characterized by disputes, distrust, suspicion and con-
flicts. I will assume that the higher degree of real adaptation, the more 
important is the EU as a regional security provider. 
The EU as a comprehensive security actor 
The EU must be understood as a comprehensive security actor. This 
argument is based on the fact that the Union is characterized by high 
level of regional integration over a broad range of policy areas. Whe-
reas the integration process in itself is a peace-promoting process that 
originates from the idea that economic interdependence leads to peace 
and stability, this integrating mechanism has gradually spilled over to 
other policy areas more directly concerned with various potential 
and/or actual security policy challenges, such as the development of 
coordinated or common policies within the area of justice and home 
affairs and of foreign, security and defence policy. Based on the idea 
that the EU has indeed become a comprehensive security actor, the 
three main policy areas – economic integration, justice and home af-
fairs and foreign, security and defence policy – will be the main focus 
here.  
 
Let us now turn to how these policy areas are covered in the associa-
tion agreements between the EU and four groups of associated coun-
tries, by focusing on the three dimensions or micro-mechanisms pre-
sented above.  
 
 
Illustrative case studies 
In order to simplify the analysis, I distinguish between four groups of 
EU-associated countries in the European region: EEA countries, can-
didate countries, ENP partner countries in the East and ENP partner 
countries in the South. There are reasons to assume that there will be a 
decreasing level of integration when we move from EEA countries to 
candidate countries and then to ENP partner countries in the East and 
finally to the ENP partner countries in the South. This has to do with 
the level of integration and how closely the countries are linked to EU 
security community. While the member states are tightly coupled, the 
others are gradually more loosely coupled to the integration process. 
 
Ideally, the analysis should cover all of these states as well as the cur-
rent EU member states, as that would provide a better basis for draw-
ing conclusions about the functioning of the EU as a regional security 
actor. However, as such an analysis is beyond the scope of this article, 
I offer a more limited analysis of the relationship between the EU and 
five selected countries from these categories: Norway, as an EEA sta-
te; Turkey and Croatia, as candidates; Ukraine, as a key ENP partner 
state in the East; and Morocco, as a key ENP partner state in the 
South. Two of the candidate countries have been chosen for study 
because Turkey, otherwise an obvious choice when dealing with Eu-
ropean security, is a very special representative of this group, as it has 
few real prospects of EU membership in the near future. I have there-
fore added Croatia, which has signed an agreement on accession in 
July 2013. 
 
These countries all have a special status within their category. Norway 
is the most integrated non-member and one of the ‘great powers’ of 
EFTA. Being a founding member of NATO and an integrated part of 
the transatlantic security community, Norway is not a trouble spot for 
European security. However, with its borders to Russia and its energy 
resources, it is an important strategic partner for the EU. In addition, 
analysing the EEA in a security perspective may show the value of 
this model also for other countries – especially now that the enlarge-
ment process is approaching its end point.  
 
Both Croatia and Turkey are candidate countries for EU membership, 
but with considerable differences. While Croatia is now poised on the 
threshold, it is uncertain whether Turkey ever will be a member. In 
any case, both countries are important for European security. Croatia 
is the first victim of the Balkan wars to become part of the EU. Sym-
Integration, Security and Associated Non-members. The EU as a Regional Security Provider   13 
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bolically this is important, as the Balkan wars of the 1990s often are 
seen as resulting from the EU’s failure to function as a security actor. 
The war has in many ways been perceived as the bad conscience of 
the Union. Thus, the integration of these countries into the EU is a 
way of making amends for this failure and for further stabilizing the 
region.  
 
Also Turkey is important for European security, not least as a poten-
tial bridge between the Christian and the Muslim worlds. This might 
prove crucial in a period with popular uprisings in northern Africa and 
the Middle East. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952 and 
has had an association agreement with the EC/EU since 1963. While 
Turkey also applied for membership already in 1987 and was granted 
EU candidate status in 1999, its prospects for actual membership 
remain uncertain. 
 
Ukraine is a main partner country in the EU’s Eastern neighbourhood, 
and has also negotiated some of the most far-reaching association 
agreements with the Union. A close relationship between the EU and 
Ukraine is important since Ukraine has the potential also of serving as 
a bridge between Russia and the rest of Europe. Moreover, it is an im-
portant transit country for Russian gas to the EU.1  
 
Finally, Morocco is an interesting partner in the South, and indeed is 
the only partner country in this region that has applied for EU mem-
bership (in 1987). Its relationship with the EC/EU dates back to early 
1963, when it signed a commercial agreement. Today it is the associa-
tion agreement from 2000 and the adoption of the ENP Action Plan in 
July 2005 that regulate relations between Morocco and the EU. 
Morocco also occupies a special position in the ENP South, as the on-
ly ENP country to have been granted ‘Advanced Status’ on deepening 
ties and cooperation in Rabat. This also makes it a pioneer in the Eu-
ropean Neighbourhood Policy. Obviously, it is of security policy in-
terest to have good relations to neighbours in the South, as has 
become increasingly evident with recent developments such as the 
‘Arab spring’. 
 
In the following I will study the association agreements/arrangements 
between the EU and these five countries in the three policy areas and 
with regard to the three main mechanisms, dimensions or variables 
presented above. I will also investigate to what extent the agreements 
in the different policy areas are seen as a whole, or whether they are 
considered as independent agreements.  
 
                                                 
1  See special issue of European Security for more on this topic (19[4]2010). 
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We need to study countries with differing degrees and types of associ-
ation to the EU in order to gain a comprehensive understanding how 
the EU functions as a regional security actor. If some of the 
agreements get high scores on all dimensions, that will be an indica-
tion of the EU as an important security policy actor in the region. If 
not, the impact of the EU can be said to be less important.  
Integration, security and the EEA Countries 
The Agreement on the European Economic Area, which entered into 
force on 1 January 1994, brings together the 27 EU member states and 
the three EFTA States — Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway — in a 
single market, the Internal Market. The EEA Agreement also states 
that if a country becomes a member of the European Union, it shall 
also apply to become party to the EEA Agreement (Article 128), thus 
leading to an enlargement of the EEA. 
 
The EEA Agreement provides for the inclusion of EU legislation cov-
ering the four freedoms — the free movement of goods, services, per-
sons and capital — throughout the 30 EEA states. In addition, it co-
vers cooperation in other important areas such as research and devel-
opment, education, social policy, the environment, consumer protec-
tion, tourism and culture – collectively known as ‘flanking and hori-
zontal’ policies. The Agreement guarantees equal rights and obliga-
tions within the Internal Market for citizens and economic operators in 
the EEA.2 
 
Example: NORWAY 
Norway has held two referenda, on joining the European Community 
(in 1972) and the European Union (in 1994), with negative results in 
both cases. The question of whether to apply yet again for EU mem-
bership has been regularly raised in the past few years in the national 
Norwegian policy debate, but with a large majority of the population 
being against membership, this is not likely to happen any time soon. 
In any case, Norway is as integrated in European policy and economy 
today as any non-member can be. 
Scope of the agreement, level of participation and adaptation 
Norway’s relations with the EU are governed mainly by the 1994 
EEA Agreement, which extends the Single Market legislation (except 
for agriculture and fisheries), from the EU member states to Norway, 
Iceland and Liechtenstein. Through the EEA Agreement, Norway also 
participates, without voting rights, in a range of EU agencies and pro-
grammes, covering, inter alia, enterprise, environment, education and 
                                                 
2  http://efta.int/eea/eea-agreement.aspx 
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research programmes. Along with its EEA/EFTA partners, Norway 
also contributes financially to social and economic cohesion in the 
EU/EEA. This means that Norway is very closely integrated in or 
tightly coupled to the EU in the economic field. The EEA Agreement 
is dynamic in the sense that it is continuously updated to correspond to 
the EU acquis. The level of participation and the contribution of re-
sources are relatively high. Norway has emerged as an extremely 
adaptive non-member that complies with most of the EU directives in 
this policy area (Sverdrup 2000). 
 
This high level of integration is not limited to the economic field: 
Norway also cooperates extensively in the field of justice and home 
affairs. It joined the Schengen cooperation in 2001, and applies the 
Schengen acquis in full. Even though Norway, as a non-member, has 
no access to the decision-making process it participates together with 
other third countries (Iceland and Switzerland) in what is known as a 
Mixed Committee. Norway is also represented in the Management 
Board of the European Borders Agency, Frontex, which aims to coor-
dinate the management of the common external borders. In addition, 
Norway has agreements with the EU concerning cooperation in vari-
ous areas, including the Dublin cooperation on asylum applications,3 
Europol and Eurojust as well as a surrender agreement based on the 
European Arrest Warrant and an agreement on Mutual Legal Assis-
tance. Furthermore, Norway and the EU have an agreement on en-
hanced police cooperation in the common endeavour to combat terror-
ism. This means that Norway also scores high on the scope of the 
agreement, the levels of participation and adaption in relation to this 
policy area as well. 
 
Finally, Norway is closely associated with EU’s CFSP/CSDP. It has 
had close political dialogue with the EU since 1994 and had followed 
the unofficial policy of signing on to EU statements wherever possi-
ble. Norway has also contributed and contributes with personnel and 
equipment to the ESDP Rapid Reaction Force and to the EU Nordic 
battle group. Norwegian officials participate in many of the CFSP 
working groups, and the country has participated 10 of the 24 CSDP 
operations undertaken by the EU so far. Since the end of 2004, there 
have been operative agreements with the EU establishing a framework 
for Norway’s participation in EU crisis management operations as 
well as an agreement on security procedures for the exchange of clas-
sified information. Moreover, Norway is the only non-member to have 
signed a cooperation agreement with the European Defence Agency. 
While that agreement does not open up for consultations at the politi-
cal level, it makes it possible for Norwegian officials to participate in 
                                                 
3  The Dublin convention establishes criteria and mechanisms for determining which state is 
responsible for dealing with an asylum application 
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all projects and programmes of the Agency. Norway is currently en-
gaged in a wide range of projects within all the directorates, with most 
extensive cooperation in R&D, where it is involved in 25 projects 
(Rieker 2006, Forthcoming). Also here, Norway hold a unique posi-
tion as a non-member with regard to the scope and levels of participa-
tion and compliance (Rieker 2006). 
 
The scope of Norway’s agreements with the EU is thus broad, and the 
level of participation and contribution is relatively high. Norway is 
seen as an adaptive non-member in most policy areas and as a valua-
ble partner for the EU on the international stage, with frequently 
shared policy priorities.  
Preliminary conclusions on Norway 
Norway today is as closely integrated into the EU as is possible for a 
non-member. It stands as an integrated part of the tightly coupled Eu-
ropean security community – indeed, more so than most candidate 
countries. The main difference between an EEA country like Norway 
and an EU member state is that the latter in addition has access to the 
decision-making processes. 
Integration, security and the candidate countries 
Currently there are five countries with the status as candidate coun-
tries: Croatia, Iceland, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Montenegro and Turkey. Being a candidate country means that mem-
bership will be accorded when the necessary requirements are met 
(and if the decision is ratified by the candidate and the member states). 
Here I take a closer look at two candidate countries, Croatia and Tur-
key, which represent two extremes: the former is very close to EU 
membership, and the latter is very far.  
 
Example 1: CROATIA 
Croatia’s declaration of independence in 1991 was followed by four 
years of war and a decade of authoritarian nationalism under President 
Franjo Tudjman. By early 2003 it had made enough progress in shak-
ing off the legacy of those years to apply for EU membership, becom-
ing the second former Yugoslav republic (after Slovenia) to do so. In 
2001 Croatia signed a Stabilization and Association Agreement with 
the EU, which entered into force in February 2005. 
 
Croatia was granted candidate status for the EU in mid-2004, and the 
entry into negotiations as well as the screening process began in Octo-
ber 2005. The negotiation process was stalled for 10 months in 
2008/2009 when Slovenia blocked Croatia’s EU accession due to an 
unresolved border issue between the two countries. In June 2010, Slo-
Integration, Security and Associated Non-members. The EU as a Regional Security Provider   17 
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venia voted to accept the ruling of international arbitrators on the dis-
pute, thereby removing this obstacle. Croatia’s EU accession talks 
were also held up until the country’s most prominent war crimes sus-
pect, General Ante Gotovina, was arrested in 2005. He was finally 
convicted by the UN War Crimes Tribunal in The Hague in April 
2011. Shortly thereafter, Croatia successfully completed its EU acces-
sion negotiations, on 30 June 2011. 
 
While the signing of the Accession Treaty took place the 9
th
 of De-
cember 2011, the Croatian referendum will be heldthe  22
nd
 of January 
2012. The ratification process, by the Parliaments of all 27 EU mem-
ber states, is expected to be concluded by the end of June 2013, and 
the entry into force and accession of Croatia to the EU is expected to 
take place on 1 July 2013. Croatian public opinion has been generally 
supportive of the EU accession process, despite some tendencies to 
Euroscepticism. For instance, this was the case in April 2011 due to 
the association of The Hague tribunal with the EU.4 
Scope of the agreement, level of participation and adaptation 
Before starting negotiations with Croatia, the acquis was divided into 
35 chapters. Following the opening of accession negotiations on 3 Oc-
tober 2005, the process of screening was completed on 18 October 
2006. The Stability and Association Agreement has been instrumental 
in preparing Croatia for membership. In relation to the EU economy 
and the internal market, Croatia is not yet taking part, but according to 
the last progress report it has met the criteria set by the EU and is thus 
prepared to become an integrated part of the internal market 
(EuropeanCommission 2010: : 17).  
 
Also as regards the chapter on Justice, Freedom and Security, Croatia 
has made substantial progress. Its asylum system has been significant-
ly improved and the Asylum Commission strengthened, but attention 
needs to be paid to integrating persons granted protection in Croatia 
and to protecting minors amongst irregular migrants. Good progress 
has been made in the field of visas, with the introduction of the uni-
form visa format and the setting-up of the Croatian visa database. 
However, alignment with the acquis on visas needs to continue. Pro-
gress has been made as regards external borders, notably in terms of 
staffing of the Border Police. However, several aspects of the IBM 
Action Plan need to be amended and the upgrading of equipment 
needs to be stepped up. Significant progress has been made in the field 
of judicial cooperation in civil and criminal matters, notably with the 
amendments to the legal framework which will allow implementation 
of the European arrest warrant with effect from accession and with the 
                                                 
4  http://www.europost.bg/article?id=1583 
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signature of an extradition agreement with Serbia. Progress has con-
tinued in counter-narcotics policy as well, but results in investigations 
and prosecution of the drug cases could still be improved 
(EuropeanCommission 2010: : 46-54). 
 
Concerning Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Com-
mon Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), Croatia has reached a high 
level of alignment in the foreign, security and defence policy. It has 
been an actively participant in the Barcelona Process – Union for the 
Mediterranean. Croatia has further developed its administrative capac-
ity to work within the EU CFSP structures. The post of Political Di-
rector in the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and European Integration is 
being established. Croatia has also participated/participates in several 
EU CSDP missions. It has been participating in the EU operation off 
the Somali coast (EU NAVFOR Somalia – ATALANTA), and has 
continued to provide logistical support to the EUFOR Althea mission 
in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The country remains committed to partic-
ipating in the EU battle groups. Administrative capacity-building 
measures have continued, including training for and participation by 
Croatian officials in relevant forums with EU counterparts. Croatia 
continues to support EU civilian missions. It is participating in the EU 
rule of law mission (EULEX) in Kosovo and the EUPOL mission in 
Afghanistan with a total of five police officers and three judicial and 
administrative officials. The 2010 progress report notes that there is 
some room for improvement in this policy area. For instance, Croatia 
needs to continue strengthening the implementation and enforcement 
of arms control, including the transparency of arms-related infor-
mation (EuropeanCommission 2010: : 64). 
Preliminary conclusions on Croatia 
Croatia seems set to become a member of the EU and thus an integrat-
ed part of the EU as from July 2012. At present, as an associated 
member and a candidate country, however, it is tightly coupled in 
some policy areas and less in other. However, the prospects for inte-
gration are real, and conditionality seems to work (Freyburg and 
Richter 2010; Subotic 2011). This is why Croatia should be seen as 
tightly coupled to the European security community. The scope of the 
agreements is broad, as all policy areas are covered, and dynamic, as 
they are continuously being updated to reflect the EU acquis. Croa-
tia’s level of participation is currently rather low with regard to the 
internal market and internal security, but there are good prospects of 
full participation as soon as the membership issue is concluded. Croa-
tia participates well in CFSP and CSDP and has even contributed to 
several operations. As to adaptation, Croatia scores very well, having 
completed the negotiations with regard to all chapters. All in all, a 
candidate country like Croatia, with good prospects of becoming a full 
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member in the near future, must be considered to be tightly coupled to 
the European security community.  
 
Example 2: TURKEY 
In many ways, Turkey is already well integrated into the European 
security complex. It has been a member of NATO since 1952, an as-
sociated member of the EU since 1963 (the Ankara accession agree-
ment) and a candidate country to the EU since 1999. Since 2005, the 
EU has even opened membership negotiations with Turkey. However, 
Turkey has a long way to go before it complies with the EU acquis 
and thereby fulfils the requirements for membership, so it is still rather 
loosely coupled to the EU as a security community. 
Scope of the agreement, level of participation and adaptation 
The Association Agreement (or the ‘Ankara agreement’), signed in 
1963, sought to integrate Turkey into a customs union with the EEC 
whilst acknowledging the final goal of membership. In November 
1970, a further protocol called the ‘Additional Protocol’ established a 
timetable for the abolition of tariffs and quotas on goods traded be-
tween Turkey and the EEC. When Turkey submitted its application 
for formal membership in the European Community in 1987, the Eu-
ropean Commission at that time responded by confirming Ankara’s 
potential membership but also by deferring the matter to more favour-
able times – citing Turkey’s economic and political situation, as well 
its poor relations with Greece and the conflict with Cyprus as creating 
an unfavourable environment with which to begin negotiations. This 
position was again confirmed in the Luxembourg European Council of 
1997 in which accession talks were started with central and eastern 
European states and Cyprus, but not Turkey. In the meantime, Turkey 
proceeded with closer integration with the European Union by agree-
ing to a customs union in 1995 – an agreement that has led to an in-
crease in its industrial production destined for export as well as in-
creased EU-origin foreign investment in the country. Finally, the Hel-
sinki European Council of 1999 proved a milestone, as the EU then 
recognized Turkey as a candidate.  
 
While negotiations have been ongoing since 2005, it is still uncertain 
whether Turkey ever will become a member of the EU. Only 13 chap-
ters have been opened, and only one (on science and research) of 
those has been completed. While the low level of compliance to the 
EU acquis is an important obstacle to membership, it is the issue of 
Cyprus that is the major problem. Since a divided Cyprus joined the 
EU in 2004, the conflict between Greece and Turkey has been lifted 
into a conflict between the EU and Turkey and also between NATO 
and the EU. Here we should note that with Cyprus the EU has a non-
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NATO member state, 37% of whose territory is occupied by a candi-
date state, Turkey, that also happens to be a NATO member. Problems 
like this may limit the EU’s possibilities of becoming a credible secu-
rity actor. However, it is also possible that Cyprus’ EU membership 
has had a certain stabilizing effect, in the sense that it makes it less 
likely for the conflict to escalate. So even though it creates problems 
for the EU in its ambitions of developing a common and effective Eu-
ropean Security and Defence Policy, for instance, it may still strength-
en the EU as a regional security actor. The EU has the possibility to 
put some pressure on Turkey. In fact, is was due to Turkey’s failure to 
apply to Cyprus the Additional Protocol to the Ankara Agreement 
that, the Council decided in December 2006 that eight relevant chap-
ters would not be opened and no chapter would be provisionally 
closed until Turkey has fulfilled its commitment. Those eight chapters 
are Free Movement of Goods, Right of Establishment and Freedom to 
Provide Services, Financial Services, Agriculture and Rural Develop-
ment, Fisheries, Transport Policy, Customs Union and External Rela-
tions (TheEconomist 2007).  
 
This has meant that the economic integration of Turkey into the EU is 
limited to the Custom Union that continues to contribute to the en-
hancement of EU–Turkey trade (some 80 billion Euro in 2009). Tur-
key is EU’s seventh biggest trading partner while the EU is Turkey’s 
biggest. However, several of Turkey’s commitments on removing 
technical barriers to trade remain unfulfilled and the EU continues to 
urge Turkey to fully implement the Customs Union. The EU provides 
guidance through the Association partnership as well as financial as-
sistance through the Instrument of Pre-accession Assistance (IPA) 
(EuropeanCommission 2010: : 5-6). 
 
The chapter on Justice, Freedom and Security has not yet been 
opened, so Turkey does not participate in this policy area and has not 
yet adapted to the EU acquis here. The EU has argued that considera-
ble efforts will still be needed before this chapter can be opened. It is 
especially in relation to border control that the EU is expecting im-
provements. 
 
As to the CFSP, the regular political dialogue covers international is-
sues of common interest. According to the latest progress report is-
sued by the European Commission, Turkey aligned itself with 74% of 
the relevant EU declarations and Council decisions 
(EuropeanCommission 2010: : 95). Like Norway, Turkey was an as-
sociated member of the Western European Union (since 1992) with a 
high level of participation. Both these countries were present at all 
meetings, but without voting rights. This changed with the launch of 
the ESDP and the gradual integration of the WEU into the EU. Even 
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though Turkey has lost this privileged status, it still contributes both to 
the EU-led military mission (EUFOR/Althea) and the police mission 
(EUPM) in Bosnia and Herzegovina as well as the rule of law mission 
in Kosovo. However, the issue of EU–NATO cooperation that would 
involve all EU member states beyond the ‘Berlin plus arrangements’ 
remains to be resolved. 
Preliminary conclusions on Turkey 
At present there are only a few of the 35 chapters covering the totality 
of EU law and policies where Turkey already complies with the EU 
acquis. Turkey still has a long way to go before it is ready to be a 
member. But even if it were to comply with the acquis, full EU mem-
bership for Turkey remains unlikely in the foreseeable future. In fact, 
the current member states would have to agree, unanimously, on 
granting Turkey membership. The Cyprus problem, combined with 
the fact that its membership bid has become a major controversy of 
the ongoing enlargement of the EU, means that it is uncertain whether 
Turkey ever will become a member (Müftüler-Bac 2008).  
 
In spite of the Customs Union of 2005, Turkey is only partly integrat-
ed with the EU in economic matters. Cooperation concerning internal 
security is close to non-existent, but there is a certain level of coopera-
tion regarding external security. This participation, however, has been 
somewhat complicated by tensions between Greece/the EU and Tur-
key over the unresolved Cyprus issue, among other things. Whether or 
not this unresolved conflict has reduced the stabilizing effects of the 
EU in the region is difficult to say. This complex situation, with Tur-
key being a non-EU NATO member and Cyprus being a non-NATO 
EU member, may also serve to prevent the conflict from escalating. In 
any case, Turkey still remains quite loosely coupled to the EU security 
community, despite its candidate status. One result has been that the 
EU has been less effective in trying to externalize norms rules and 
values than it has been towards other candidate countries with better 
prospects of membership. Independently, however, Turkey still takes 
a certain responsibility for its own neighbourhood. A few years ago it 
even launched a ‘zero problems with neighbours policy’ and made 
efforts to normalize relations with neighbouring countries. However, 
more recently – and especially with the varying reactions to the Arab 
Spring – Turkey has also come to realize that it cannot be friends with 
everybody (Kinzer 2011). While the ‘zero problems policy’ is upheld, 
Turkey has in a rather complicated relationship to many of its neigh-
bours. For instance, the Turkish political leadership has hinted at mili-
tary intervention against Syria if Bashar al-Assad doesn’t stop murder-
ing his own people. However, there is not only the relationship with 
Syria that is problematic. The relationship with Israel is also tense as 
long as Israel continues to drill for gas with the Greek-Cypriots in the 
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east Mediterranean; friendship with Iran has soured after Turkey 
agreed to let NATO deploy parts of its missile shield on Turkish soil; 
diplomatic relations with Armenia continue to be problematic; and 
finally, membership talks with the European Union are, as we have 
seen, still frozen. 
Integration, Security and the ENP countries 
The ENP was developed in 2004, aimed at creating a ‘ring of friends’ 
around the eastern and southern periphery of the enlarged European 
Union by incorporating non-members into an EU-led economic re-
gion. The ENP proposes a framework for developing new types of in-
tegration arrangements with the whole range of neighbourhood coun-
tries, arrangements that stop short of enlargement but go beyond the 
association or cooperation templates currently in place. Central to the 
ENP are the Action Plans between the EU and each ENP partner, 
which set out an agenda of political and economic reforms with short- 
and medium-term priorities of 3 to 5 years at a time. They build on 
existing agreements between the EU and the partner in question, such 
as Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCA) or Association 
Agreements (AA), but are more ambitious in terms of offering politi-
cal association and deeper economic integration, increased mobility 
and more people-to-people contacts. Within the ENP, the EU offers its 
neighbours a privileged relationship, based on mutual commitment to 
common values (democracy and human rights, rule of law, good gov-
ernance, market economy principles, sustainable development, and so 
on). The level of ambition in each relationship, however, depends on 
the extent to which these values are shared.5  
 
Let us now take a closer look at two countries, Ukraine and Morocco, 
representing the Eastern and the Southern neighbourhood, respective-
ly. 
 
Example 1: UKRAINE 
Scope of the agreement, level of participation and adaptation 
Relations between Ukraine and the EU are currently shaped via the 
European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), where Ukraine is said to be a 
priority partner. The EU has been seeking an increasingly close rela-
tionship with Ukraine, going beyond cooperation, to gradual economic 
integration and deepening of political cooperation. However, this posi-
tion has recently been challenged by the decision by the Ukrainian 
President, Viktor Yanukovich, to put former Prime Minister Yulia 
Timoshenko in jail. 
                                                 
5  Not surprisingly, the ENP is not yet fully activated for countries like  Algeria, Libya and 
Syria in the South (or Belarus in the East). 
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The political dialogue between the EU and Ukraine started in 1994 
when the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) was signed. 
That document focused on economic and social issues as well as on 
the necessity of improving public government and guaranteeing free 
press and civil rights. The framework set for political discussions was 
modest: yearly meetings between EU Troika and Ukrainian leadership 
and some inter-ministerial consultations. The Partnership and Cooper-
ation agreement of 1994 entered into force in 1998 and expired in 
2008. None of the top level meetings brought any major changes to a 
reserved EU approach. Leaders focused chiefly on economic transi-
tion and human rights records as well as on issues in connection with 
the Chernobyl nuclear power plant and its containment. 
 
A Joint EU–Ukraine Action Plan was endorsed by the European 
Council on 21 February 2005. It was based on the Partnership and 
Cooperation Agreement of 1994 and provided, according to the Euro-
pean Commission, a comprehensive and ambitious framework for 
joint work with Ukraine in all key areas of reform. Negotiations on a 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement between Ukraine 
and the European Union started on 18 February 2008 between the 
Ukrainian government and the EU Trade Commissioner. As of May 
2011, three outstanding issues remained to be solved:  quotas on 
Ukrainian grain exports, access to the EU's services market, and geo-
graphical names of Ukrainian commodities. Apart from these issues, 
the deal was ready and was expected to be signed in December 
2011(EuropeanCommission 2011). Then, with the unresolved issue 
concerning the imprisonment of the former Prime Minister, the EU 
postponed the signing of the Agreement. While this is a setback, it 
may also be interpreted as an indication that EU conditionality works: 
if an associated country does not fulfil the requirements or comply 
with the EU acquis, integration into the EU security community is not 
possible. 
 
If this issue is solved and the agreement is signed, Ukraine will be the 
ENP country that is the most integrated in economic terms. In other 
policy areas, such as justice and home affairs and CFSP, cooperation 
is more limited, although Ukraine has also participated.  
 
In relation to justice and home affairs, the EU and Ukraine have deep-
ened their dialogue on the establishment of a visa-free regime for 
short-term travel. Several expert visits took place in 2009 to identify 
where improvements are needed in Ukraine’s management of migra-
tion flows and border-related issues. Currently, 40% of Schengen vi-
sas are delivered free of charge under the Visa Facilitation and Read-
mission Agreements (active from January 2008). There is also contin-
ued cooperation with Moldova on border management, particularly 
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through the EU Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM), including in 
the fight against smuggling and illegal trafficking. A Strategic Coop-
eration Agreement was signed between the EU and Europol at the 
EU–Ukraine Summit in December 2009 (EuropeanCommission 
2011).    
 
In relations to CFSP, Ukraine has aligned itself to nearly all EU’s 
Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) positions and has taken 
part in several of the EU’s ESDP/CSDP operations in 2010 
(EuropeanCommission 2011). Currently, Ukraine is one of 14 ‘third 
states’ (alongside Albania, Angola, Canada, Chile, Croatia, FYROM, 
Iceland, Montenegro, New Zealand, Norway, Switzerland, Turkey, 
and the USA) contributing to the EU’s ongoing missions and opera-
tions, and the only Eastern partner. Ukraine is engaged in the Europe-
an Union Police Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the 
ATALANTA mission combating piracy off the coast of Somalia. On 1 
July 2011 the Ukrainian Naval Forces joined the Greek-led European 
Union Battle Group HELBROC on six-month stand-by duty (Zarembo 
2011).  
 
In terms of adaptation to the EU acquis, there has been important pro-
gress in the economic area, but fewer positive signs in the political 
domain. In fact, Ukraine has experienced a deterioration of respect for 
fundamental freedom, notably as regards the freedom of the media, 
freedom of assembly and democratic standards. Other key challenges 
are comprehensive reform of the judiciary and the fight against cor-
ruption. According to a recent article, there has been limited real pro-
gress in Ukraine’s internal preparations for closer integration with the 
EU (Stegniy 2011: : 51). 
Preliminary conclusions on Ukraine 
The agreements between Ukraine and the EU have a fairly broad 
scope. Ukraine also participates and contributes to some extent in the 
various policy areas. While there still are many challenges to over-
come related to the adaptation of the EU acquis in the political do-
main, Ukraine is the ENP country that is most integrated in economic 
terms. In addition it participates and contributes in the area of internal 
and external security. While there is still some way to go in relation to 
adaptation to the EU acquis – especially in the political domain – the 
overall conclusion is that Ukraine is rather tightly coupled to the EU 
security community. Indeed, at present it is more tightly coupled than 
Turkey, even though Turkey is officially a candidate country. On the 
other hand, Ukraine is more loosely coupled than Croatia, which is 
soon to become a member of the European Union.  
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Example 2: MOROCCO 
Scope of the agreement, level of participation and adaptation 
Relations between the EC/EU and Morocco date back to 1963. They 
have received a significant boost in the past decade with the entry into 
force of the Association Agreement of March 2000 and the adoption 
of the Action Plan in July 2005 as part of the European Neighbour-
hood Policy. With ‘Advanced Status’ granted to Morocco on 13 Octo-
ber 2008, the partnership entered a new and more ambitious phase. 
 
While diplomatic relations date back to 1963, the first cooperation 
agreement was signed in 1976. Morocco also applied for membership 
in the EC in 1987, but the application was rejected by Community 
foreign ministers as they did not consider Morocco to be a European 
country.6  
 
With no prospects for membership, Morocco has been a part of the 
Barcelona Process and later the Neighbourhood Policy. At the 1995 
Barcelona Conference the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership was inau-
gurated, establishing a policy with ambitious and long-term objectives 
in the fields of the political and security partnership, the economic and 
financial partnership and cooperation in social, cultural and human 
affairs. To develop these conditions bilaterally, the EU and Morocco 
set up the EU–Morocco Association Agreement in 2000. This docu-
ment forms the legal basis for relations between Morocco and the EU.  
 
Beyond this agreement, the EU also granted Morocco what is termed 
advanced status in 2008 on deepening ties and cooperation – the first 
country in the region to be granted such status. The agreement consti-
tutes a ‘roadmap’ which widens the sphere of EU–Morocco bilateral 
relations by setting out new objectives in three main areas: closer po-
litical relations, with the holding of an EU–Morocco summit (the first, 
held in 2010, represents the first summit between the EU and an Afri-
can/Arab country) and the establishment of consultation mechanisms 
at ministerial level;  integration of the single market on the basis of 
gradual adoption of the Community acquis and sectorial cooperation;  
and a focus on the human dimension. 
 
Morocco tops the list of partners that benefited from the EU’s finan-
cial support as part of neighbourhood assistance, receiving about 205 
million euro in 2009. According to the ENP country report from 2010, 
the status of Morocco after its second year with advanced status is 
generally positive. Morocco has become an important economic part-
ner for the EU in the region. It is also a strategic ally in facing many 
                                                 
6  However, the rejection may well have also been connected to the country's very poor 
democratic and human rights standards, which have since greatly improved, resulting in 
an unofficial attempt to renew the application.  
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common challenges, including the fight against terrorism and illegal 
migration. However, there is still room for improvement in many are-
as, especially concerning the development of an independent juridical 
system (EuropeanCommission 2010: : 4). 
 
On the political front, Morocco’s advanced status offers the opportuni-
ty to deepen dialogue and cooperation on key strategic issues that 
challenge both parties. While Morocco has agreed to give support to 
CFSP declarations on a case-to-case basis, the two parties have not yet 
agreed on implementation procedures, and the cooperation remains on 
the declaratory level (Lecha 2011: : 238). On the other hand, besides 
setting up an EU–Morocco summit and holding regular meetings to 
enhance political dialogue, the new political agenda includes Moroc-
co’s participation in crisis management operations (military and civil-
ian) with the EU and supporting statements of the Common European 
Security Policy (Idrissi 2011). Since 2004, Morocco has actively par-
ticipated in EUFOR Althea mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Its 
positive and cooperative approach to CSDP issues reflects Morocco’s 
commitment to the EU.  
 
Regarding the security dimension, cooperation has aimed at develop-
ing border control mechanisms, Morocco’s participation in training 
and seminars of the European Police College, the establishment of co-
operation between Morocco and the European Police Office and deep-
er cooperation with the European Monitoring Centre for Drugs and 
Drug Addiction (Idrissi 2011). 
 
In terms of judicial cooperation, emphasis is placed on the EU support 
to the proposed upgrading of the Moroccan legislative and institution-
al framework for asylum in accordance with international standards. 
To this can be added the possibility for Morocco to access the conven-
tions of the Council of Europe related to judicial matters, open to non-
member participation, and the establishment of a cooperative agree-
ment between Morocco and Eurojust (the European agency for the 
fight against crime), and cooperation on pursuing reforms in order to 
implement all recommendations of the Equity and Reconciliation Na-
tional Instance, a Moroccan body in charge of assessing past cases of 
human rights abuses (Idrissi 2011).  
Preliminary conclusions on Morocco 
Other Mediterranean non-EU partners are far from Morocco’s level of 
participation in various EU policies, including CSDP. The only excep-
tion is Turkey, which in addition to being a Mediterranean partner 
country also has official status as an EU candidate country. Thus, it 
seems as if Morocco has welcomed the ENP philosophy, as the it has 
offered integration à la carte and allowed those partner that were ready 
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to undertake the necessary reforms to go faster and deeper. The fact 
that Morocco has obtained ‘advanced status’ is an example of this. 
Thus, Morocco in the South, like Ukraine in the East, is now rather 
closely coupled to the EU security community, but less so than official 
candidate countries like Croatia. The scope of the agreement is quite 
broad and the level of participation in the economic area as well as 
internal and external security are relatively high compared to other 
ENP countries, especially those of the South. In terms of adaptation to 
the EU acquis, there is still room for improvement. Here we may note 
that Morocco has been more open to democratization than its neigh-
bours (Hirst 2011). Already in 1962 Morocco drafted its first post-
colonial constitution that, although basing its governance model on an 
all-powerful monarch, nevertheless pushed the boundaries of tradi-
tional Arab governance by advancing institutions with powers and au-
thority of their own. Four additional modifications in 1970, 1972, 
1992 and 1996 further advanced the principles of rights which people 
all over the world were demanding. Most recently, faced with the un-
relenting force of political change with the Arab Spring in 2011, Mo-
rocco's King Mohammad VI proposed the writing of a new constitu-
tion. Drafting the new text were members of Moroccan society: from 
the private sector, universities, religious organizations and civil socie-
ty. The proposed constitution radically alters Morocco's system of 
governance, providing increasing power to elected government (in-
cluding the Prime Minister), establishing the equality of the sexes and 
improving civil liberties. All the same, there is still a long way to go 
before the country lives up to democratic standards – for instance, it 
has been argued that the security apparatus, cabinet positions and reli-
gious appointments still remain under royal control. Despite these crit-
icisms, the Moroccan constitutional reforms appear to be genuine.  
 
 
Concluding remarks 
This article has analysed the relationship between security, integration 
and associated non-EU members, seeking to increase our understand-
ing of how the EU functions as a regional security actor through the 
mechanism of integration. We have examined the extent to which five 
associated states have been integrated into the EU by looking at the 
scope of their association agreements, their level of participation in 
EU policies and the level of adaptation to EU rules and norms in the 
three main policy areas – economic integration, internal security and 
external security. The main findings of the empirical analysis are 
summarized and presented in Table 1.  
 
Table 1. The integration of associated non-members into the EU 
 
*Assuming that the Deep Free Trade Agreement with the EU is signed 
 
My initial assumption was that the EEA country, Norway, would 
score high on most of the dimensions studied, and that scores would 
gradually become lower as we moved from EEA countries to candi-
date countries, to ENP countries in the East, and finally to ENP coun-
tries in the South. The reason was that I expected these countries to be 
gradually more loosely coupled to the EU security community. To 
some extent, we find that this is in fact the case.  
 
However, there are some interesting deviations. Even though Croatia 
and Turkey are both candidate countries, they do not score higher than 
the ENP countries, on all dimensions. Whereas Croatia’s agreements 
  EEA CANDIDATES 
 
ENP East ENP South 
  Norway Croatia Turkey  Ukraine* Morocco 
 Dimensions      
Economic  
integration 
Scope Wide Wide Medium Wide Wide 
Participation High Low Medium Medium Medium 
Adaptation High High Medium Medium Medium 
Internal  
security 
(JHA) 
 
Scope  Wide Wide Low Wide Low 
Participation High Low Low Medium Low 
Adaptation High High Low Low Low 
External  
security 
(CFSP/ 
CSDP) 
Scope Wide Wide Medium Wide Medium 
Participation  High Medium Medium Medium Medium 
Adaptation High High Low Medium Medium 
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with the EU are broad and the level of adaptation are high in all policy 
areas, the level of participation is low – and often lower than for the 
ENP countries examined here. This is probably because a candidate 
country is included in the various EU policy areas before it actually 
becomes a member. Still, with a high level of adaptation, Croatia is 
ready to participate in all policy areas and must be seen as an integrat-
ed part of the EU security community. As for Turkey, it too is a can-
didate country, but scores lower than the ENP countries on most di-
mensions. This may be explained by the fact that Turkey’s prospects 
for full EU membership have dwindled, and that very few chapters 
have yet been opened for negotiation. The ENP countries chosen for 
study here, Ukraine and Morocco, are both the most advanced in their 
categories. And here we can note that the level of Europeanization is, 
to some extent, more important for these countries than for certain of 
the candidate countries. This is an interesting finding, especially now 
when the enlargement of the EU is reaching saturation point. The case 
of Morocco is perhaps the most intriguing, since this country is cultur-
ally more distant from the current member states. However, the fact 
that Morocco still desires a close relationship to the EU and that it also 
is the country that has had the most peaceful transition towards in-
creased democracy in recent years may indicate that the ENP has be-
come a more successful instrument for expanding the European secu-
rity community than the enlargement process currently is.  
 
What then does this tell us about the EU as a security actor? We can 
draw three lessons from this analysis. First, it is still the traditional 
security aspects of the integration process that are the most important: 
the relationship between economic integration and security. Second, 
while there are several models of association, all of them seem to pro-
duce similar effects: they may differ in form and speed, but the direc-
tion is the same. Finally, all these adaptations and associations are 
characterized by soft power. The various processes have involved ne-
gotiations, dialogues and voluntary adaptation – with no use of threats, 
power or force. Surely, then, this is the key aspect of the EU as a re-
gional security actor. 
  
 
References  
Adler, Emanuel, and Michael Barnett, eds. 1998. Security 
Communities. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Buzan, Barry. 1991. People, States and Fear: A Security Agenda for 
the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd edition. Brighton: Wheatsheaf. 
Buzan, Barry , and Ole Wæver. 2004. Regions and Powers: The 
Structure of National Security. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Buzan, Barry, Ole Wæver, and Jaap de Wilde. 1998. Security. A New 
Framework for Analysis. London: Lynne Rienner. 
Deutsch, Karl W. 1957. Political Community and the North Atlantic 
Area. International Organization in the Light of Historical 
Experience. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
The Economist. 2007. ‘The ins and outs. The EU's most effective 
foreign-policy instrument has been enlargement. But how far 
can it go?’ 15. March. 
Epstein, Rachel A., and Ulrich Sedelmeier. 2008. ‘Beyond 
conditionality:international institutions in postcommunist 
Europe after enlargement’. Journal of European Public Policy 
15 (6): 795–805. 
European Commission. 2010. Croatia 2010 Progress Report. 
COM(2010)660 Brussels. 
———. 2010. ‘Mise an oevre de la politique européenne de voisinage 
en 2010. Rapport pays: Maroc’. Document de traivail conjoint 
des services COM (2011)303 Brussels 
———. 2010. Turkey 2010 Progress Report. Commission Staff 
Working Document COM (2010) 660 Brussels. 
———. 2011. Implementation of the European Neighbourhood Policy 
in 2010. Country report on: Ukraine. COM (2011)303 
Brussels. 
Featherstone, Kevin. 2002. ‘Europeanization in theory and practice.’ 
In Europeanization of Security and Defence Policy, eds. 
Elisabeth Davidson, Arita Eriksson and Jan Hallenberg. 
Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College. 13–20. 
Freyburg, Tina , and Solveig Richter. 2010. ‘National identity matters: 
the limited impact of EU political conditionality in the 
Western Balkans’. Journal of European Public Policy 17 (2): 
263–281. 
Hill, Christopher. 2007. ‘The future of the European Union as a global 
actor.’ In Managing a Multilevel Foreign Policy: The EU in 
International Affairs, eds. Paolo Foradori, Paolo Rosa and 
Riccardo Scartezzini. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books. 
32 Pernille Rieker 
Hillion, Christophe. 2011. Integrating an Outsider. An EU perspective 
on Relations with Norway. Oslo: Europautredningen. 
Hirst, Joel D. 2011. ‘Morocco – an Arab Spring success’. In 
Huffington Post, 27. June.  
Hoffmann, Stanley. 2000. ‘Towards a Common Foreign and Security 
Policy?’. Journal of International Affairs 38 (2): 189–199. 
Hyde-Price, Adrian. 2006. ‘“Normative” power Europe: a realist 
critique’. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2): 217–234. 
———. 2008. ‘A "Tragic Actor"?: A realist perspective on “Ethical 
Power Europe”’. International Affairs 84 (1): 49–64. 
Idrissi, Boutaina Ismaili. 2011. Analysis of Morocco–European Union 
artnership within the Framework of the Advanced Status: 
Main Features and Challenges. Oslo: Europautredningen. 
Ikenberry, John G., and Charles A. Kupchan. 1990. 'Socialization and 
hegemonic power'. International Organization 44 (3): 283–
315. 
Kagan, Robert. 2003. Of Paradise and Power. New York: Alfred A. 
Knopf. 
Kelly, Judith. 2006. ‘New wine in old wineskins: promoting political 
reforms through the New European Neighbourhood Policy’. 
Journal of Common Market Studies 44 (1): 29–55. 
Keohane, Robert O, and Joseph S. Nye. 1977. Power and 
Interdependence: World Politics in Transition. Boston, MA: 
Little, Brown and Company. 
Kinzer, Stephen 2011. ‘Triumphant Turkey?’ The New York Review of 
Books 18. August. 
Krasner, Stephen. 1976. ‘State power and the structure of international 
trade’. World Politics 28 (3): 317–347. 
Lavanex, Sandra. 2004. ‘EU external governance in “wider Europe”’. 
Journal of European Public Policy 11 (4): 680–700. 
Lavanex, Sandra, and Frank Schimmelfenning. 2009 ‘EU rules 
beyond EU borders: theorizing external governance in 
European politics’. Journal of European Public Policy 16 (6): 
791–812. 
Lecha, Eduard Soler I. 2011. ‘Converging, diverging and 
instrumentalizing European Security and Defence Policy in the 
Mediterranean’. Mediterranean Politics 15 (2): 231–248. 
Manners, Ian. 2002. ‘Normative Power Europe: a contradiction in 
terms?’ Journal of Common Market Studies 40 (2): 235–258. 
———. 2006. ‘Normative Power Europe reconsidered: beyond the 
crossroads’. Journal of European Public Policy 13 (2): 182–
199. 
McCormick, John. 2007. The European Superpower. Houndmills: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
Mérand, Frédéric (2010). 2010. ‘Pierre Bourdieu and the birth of 
ESDP’. Security Studies 19 (2): 342–374. 
Integration, Security and Associated Non-members. The EU as a Regional Security Provider   33 
 
33 
Moracscik, Andrew. 2010. ‘Europe: rising superpower in a bipolar 
world.’ In Rising States, Rising Institutions, eds. Alan S. 
Alexandroff and Andrew F. Cooper. Washington, DC: 
Brookings Institution Press. 
Müftüler-Bac, Meltem. 2008. ‘Turkey’s acession to the European 
Union: the impact of the EU's internal dynamics’. 
International Studies Perspectives 9: 201–219. 
Olsen, Johan P. 2002. ‘The many faces of Europeanization’. Arena 
Working Papers (on-line version: 
http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/wp02_2.htm)  Oslo: 
Arena. 
Pedersen, Thomas. 2002.‘Cooperative hegemony: power, ideas and 
institutions in regional integration’. Review of International 
Studies 28 (4): 677–696. 
Pouliot, Vincent. 2008. ‘The logic of practicality: a theory of practice 
of security communities’. International Organization 62 (2): 
359–384. 
———. 2010. International Security in Practice: The Politics of 
NATO–Russia Diplomacy. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Radaelli, Claudio M. 2000. ‘Whither Europeanizaton? Concept 
stretching and substantive change’. European Integration 
online Papers (EIoP) 4 (8): http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2000-
008a.htm. 
Rieker, Pernille. 2006. Europeanization of National Security Identity. 
The EU and the changing Security Identities of the Nordic 
States. London: Routledge. 
———. 2006. ‘Norway and the ESDP: Explaining Norwegian 
participation in the EU’s security policy’. European Security 
(3): 281–298. 
———. 2012. ‘Integration, security and the European Neighborhood. 
The importance of the ENP as a security policy instrument’. 
Studia Diplomatica (1). 
———. Forthcoming. ‘Active participation despite limited influence. 
Explaining Norway's participation in the EU's security policy.’ 
In Common or Divided Security: German and Norwegian 
Approaches to 21st Century Security Challenges, eds. Robin 
Allers and Carlo Masala. Rowman & Littlefield 
Sjursen, Helene. 2006. ‘What kind of power?’ Journal of European 
Public Policy 13 (2): 169–181. 
Stegniy, Oleksandr. 2011. ‘Ukraine and the Eastern Partnership:  
“'Lost in Translation”’. Communist Studies and Transition 
Politics 27 (1): 50–72. 
Subotic, Jelena. 2011. ‘Europe is a state of mind: identity and 
Europeanization in the Balkans’. International Studies 
Quarterly 55: 309–330. 
34 Pernille Rieker 
Sverdrup, Ulf I. 2000. ‘Ambiguity and adaptation: Europeanization of 
administrative institutions as loosely coupled processes’. 
Arena Report 12, Oslo: Arena. 
Sæter, Martin. 1998. Comprehensive Neofunctionalism: Bridging 
Realism and Liberalism in the Study of European Integration. 
Oslo: Norwegian Institute of International Affairs (NUPI). 
———. 2003. ‘EU-prosessen omformer europeisk sikkerhet.’ In En 
annerledes supermakt? Sikkerhets- og forsvarspolitikken i EU, 
eds. Pernille Rieker and Ståle Ulriksen. Oslo: NUPI. 
Toje, Asle. 2011. ‘The European Union as a small power’. Journal of 
Common Market Studies 49 (1): 43–60. 
Zarembo, Kateryna. 2011. ‘Ukraine in EU security: an undervalued 
partner’. Policy Brief 88 Madrid: The Fundación para las Relaciones 
Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE).  
 
